Public Accounts Committee
Public
Audit (Wales) Bill
PA5 -
Public and Commercial Services Union
Mr Darren
Millar
Chair of the
Public Accounts Committee
National
Assembly for Wales
Cardiff Bay
CF99 1NA
11 September
2012
Dear Mr
Millar
Public
Accounts Committee - invitation to provide evidence on the Public
Audit (Wales) Bill
1.
Thank you for
the invitation of the Public Accounts Committee to provide evidence
to support the work of the Committee in scrutinising the Public
Audit (Wales) Bill. I am responding on behalf of the WAO branch of
the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), which has agreed
this letter.
- PCS agrees with
the Government’s view that the governance arrangements of the
WAO need to be strengthened, and that the creation of a single
board to oversee the work of the AGW is the best way of doing this.
We agree with the objectives of the Bill as stated in paragraph 21
of the Explanatory Memorandum, and we welcome many of the
provisions contained in the Bill. However, we have serious doubts
that the governance proposals in the Bill are the best way of
meeting its stated aims. We also have concerns about the transfer
provisions and the requirement for the WAO’s staff’s
terms and conditions to be broadly in line with those of the Welsh
Government.
Governance
arrangements
- The WAO Board
will have executive responsibility for running the WAO, including
the employment of staff and the deployment of other resources. At
the same time, it has important scrutiny and oversight functions,
and a membership that seems more suited to a non-executive board.
The functions of the board are not entirely clear, and we do not
understand how it can ensure greater oversight of the Auditor
General and the WAO in the form currently proposed. We have several
specific concerns about the proposals, which are set out
below.
Independence of
the Auditor General
- The Board will
need to approve the AGW’s annual plan, as well as its own,
creating a potential threat to the Auditor General’s
independence and a conflict of interest for the Auditor General. We
do not understand how these plans will differ when the WAO’s
resources are deployed almost exclusively in the service of the
AGW’s statutory duties. The content of the respective plans
is not made clear in the Bill and there is a risk that the WAO may
seek undue influence over the AGW’s programme of work to the
detriment of the Bill’s avowed intention of preserving the
Auditor General’s independence.
- The WAO and AGW
are required to agree a joint financial estimate, creating a
further risk to the AGW’s independence, in particular in
terms of his or her requirement for sufficient, adequately trained
staff to undertake audits. The Bill does not say how any conflicts
are to be resolved. This is a worrying omission as any legal
proceedings would be highly damaging to the reputation of public
audit in Wales and would be debilitating for the WAO as an
organisation. Any conflict would cause considerable difficulty for
our members as they would face divided loyalties: employees of the
WAO but serving the AGW, the one in dispute with the other. We
suggest that the Auditor General has the final say on the Estimate
laid before the Assembly in the event of a dispute, but the Board
then has the option of raising its concerns formally with the
National Assembly before the latter votes on the annual budget
motion.
Membership of
the Board
- The Board will
be overwhelmingly non-executive: five of the seven members will
come from outside the organisation and will have limited experience
of the WAO. However, they will have important executive functions.
We consider it essential that an executive board has a greater
proportion of executive members, who would need to be senior
managers within the WAO, in order to bring sufficient managerial
experience to the Board. A much better balance could be
achieved with two or three executive members, in addition to the
AGW, while still maintaining a majority of non-executive
members.
Oversight and
accountability of the new WAO
- One of the
principal intentions of the Bill is to hold the AGW to account for
his management of the WAO. However, the Board’s scrutiny
functions are compromised by its executive powers. The Board cannot
credibly scrutinise its own decisions, which may include sensitive
matters such as severance payments and staff training –
exactly the issues that led to the governance failures that
precipitated this Bill. It is quite possible that the non-executive
members’ appetite for critical scrutiny will diminish over
time as they are implicated in decisions they themselves have taken
and any unwelcome consequences of those decisions become
apparent.
- The Bill does
not establish any reliable mechanisms for the WAO itself to be
scrutinised. It is not reasonable to expect the PAC or another
Assembly committee to exercise the in-depth scrutiny currently
provided by the three existing governance committees (Audit and
Risk Management, Remuneration and Resources). The Bill does not
require these committees to be retained or to report the outcome of
their work to the Assembly. Far from improving the supervision and
oversight of the WAO, the Bill diminishes it.
- In our view,
the proposed relationship between the AGW and the WAO is fraught
and potentially untenable. We recognise that the intention is to
ensure that the AGW is held to account for the exercise of his/her
functions as AGW. We consider that this can best be achieved by
legislating for the creation of a non-executive board exercising
solely advisory, supervisory and scrutiny functions, but not
executive decision-making, such as agreement of work
programmes.
- We would expect
the Board to provide wide-ranging advice to the AGW and strong,
independent and comprehensive scrutiny of the WAO’s
operations; it should not be seen as a soft option. We believe this
option would provide more robust oversight of the WAO; the
Government offers no rationale for its assertions to the contrary
(paragraph 94 of the Explanatory Memorandum). A single,
non-executive board would remove conflicts of interest and would be
cleaner, simpler and (according to the Government’s own
impact assessment) considerably less expensive than the
Government’s preferred option of an executive
board.
Staff
related matters
Transfer
provisions
- We welcomed the
commitment in paragraph 242 of the consultation document that any
transfer of staff would be in accordance with the Cabinet’s
Office Statement of Practice on Staff Transfers and that provision
would be made so that the transfer of employment would be on no
less favourable terms than would be the case if TUPE applied.
We are therefore disappointed and concerned that the Bill does not
make good on this commitment. The transfer provisions in Schedule
3, Part 3 do not include provisions that replicate the TUPE
regulations, which prevent adverse alterations to an
employee’s terms and conditions that are connected to a
transfer between one organisation and another. We believe that
these provisions should be added and the transfer should be treated
explicitly as a “machinery of government”
transfer.
- We also request
that paragraph 5(2)(b)(ii) of Schedule 3 of the Bill makes clear
that an employee’s continuous service includes not just
service with the AGW, but also service with the WAO’s
predecessor organisations (the Audit Commission and the National
Audit Office) that was transferred into the WAO when it was created
on 1 April 2005. This is an important addition because many of our
members have the majority of their service in these predecessor
organisations.
Terms and
conditions to be “broadly in line” with the Welsh
Government
- Paragraph 31 of
Schedule 1 of the Bill requires the WAO’s staff’s terms
of employment to be “broadly in line with those members of
the staff of the Welsh Government.” We agree that it is
important for the employment practices, terms and conditions for
staff to be firmly rooted in public sector norms and standards.
Fair and open competition using objective criteria must be the
basis for staff selection, within the framework of a robust equal
opportunities policy. In terms of pay, we accept the principle that
the WAO should have due regard to appropriate comparators in the
public sector. However, we have two important reservations about
the proposed link with the Welsh Government:
a)
It
is essential that the auditor of public bodies is independent, and
seen to be independent, of the organisations audited. For this
reason we consider it inappropriate to link terms and conditions
explicitly to the Welsh Government, especially as this organisation
is such an important recipient of audit scrutiny. It would be very
difficult to undertake a value for money study on a certain aspect
of the Welsh Government’s employment practices, for example
its recruitment and selection procedures, if the auditor was
required to follow those procedures. The conflict of interest is
self-evident.
b)
There is an
implicit assumption that the Welsh Government’s practices are
the best benchmark for public audit. However, the nature of the
Welsh Government’s work is quite different from the
WAO’s. The staff of the WAO have a much higher proportion of
specialist and relatively senior staff who travel much more
extensively than the typical civil servant at the Welsh Government.
There needs therefore to be sufficient flexibility to respond to
market conditions and, crucially, to create grading structures and
pay scales that meet audit requirements rather than those of
another organisation. For this reason, it is essential that any
“broadly in line” wording does not require close
alignment to any single aspect of the Welsh Government’s (or
any other organisation’s) employment practices and
organisational structures.
- The term
“broadly in line” is so vague as to make enforcement
difficult. Furthermore, it creates a potential conflict with the
transfer provisions in Schedule 3, Part 3 that require
employees’ existing terms to be transferred to the new WAO.
We consider that a provision along the lines of that in paragraph
17(2) of Schedule 2 of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit
Act 2011 – to “have regard to the desirability of
keeping the terms broadly in line with those applying to civil
servants ” – would be a sufficient safeguard. We
consider that if a comparator for audit staff is to be included in
the legislation, it would be more appropriate to use the National
Assembly for Wales rather than the Welsh Government. This link
would ensure that the terms and conditions of the staff are broadly
in line with those of staff working for the body that funds the
auditor and to which it is ultimately accountable. Furthermore, it
would demonstrate audit independence from the Welsh
Government.
Employee
representative
- PCS welcomes
the principle of having an employee representative as a member of a
non-executive advisory board, and we consider that the ability to
represent employee experience and views at Board meetings would be
valuable. We welcome the principle of an employee
representative if that is the intention of the proposals. We note
that this is now considered good practice, and we understand that
all Health Boards in Wales have one. But this would only be
appropriate if the Board was supervisory in nature. We do not think
an employee representative should take part in executive decision
making since this would compromise their position as a
representative of the workforce.
- We do not have
fixed views on how employee members should be appointed, but the
proposed method is not conducive to the selection of an employee
representative. The WAO’s employees would need the major say
in who that person should be, and we do not understand how the
non-executive members could assess applications “on
merit” when the criterion is “employee
experience.” Our preference is that the employee
representative should be elected by the staff.
- The
arrangements proposed in the consultation are more suitable for the
appointment of executive members. The AGW would clearly need a
major role in determining which of the WAO’s senior managers
should be members.
We
look forward to giving oral evidence on the Bill on 1st
October.
Yours
sincerely
Sian
Wiblin
PCS Negotiations Officer, Wales
On behalf of the Branch Executive Committee, Wales Audit
Office